On semantics and the process of word-generated knowledge in Hindu philosophy.

Commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, work on the Vedanta philosophy.

Commentary on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, work on the Vedanta philosophy; Sanskrit text with English translation.

Pratyakṣakhaṇḍa of Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa, 13th cent., basic work on Hindu logic and epistimelogy of the Neo-Nyaya school in Hindu philosophy; a study.

Research papers on Hindu philosophy and Sanskrit grammar.

Rāmānuja is known as a theistic ācārya who interpreted Brahmasūtras in Viśiṣṭādvaita point of view. He propounded his philosophy by refuting Kevāldvaita system of Śaṅkara. He criticized the existence and knowledge of indeterminate objects and refuted the concept of Nirviśeṣa Brahman. Therefore, Brahman for him is Saviśeṣa. The name Viśiṣṭādvaita itself signifies that it is Qualified Monism. Brahman is qualified by matter and soul. Matter and soul though real are completely dependent on Brahman for their existence. Hegel is a German (...) Philosopher who propounded Absolute Idealism. Hegel solved the problem of reality from a synthetic and positive point of view. Predecessors of Hegel were reflecting on Reality with one sided abstractions. Absolute is ultimately real for him. Hegel’s Absolute is not devoid of all objects and qualities. Absolute is inclusive of all the categories and all things of the world. Absolute is not abstract like Śaṅkara’s Brahman but it goes very much closer to Ramanuja’s Saviśeṣa Brahman. Thus, both these philosopher though differ in some principles which are very peculiar to them, they definitely meet at on one point of ‘Concrete Monism’. Logical method adopted by them to reach towards their goal is also strikingly similar. The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of monism according to Rāmānuja and Hegel with philosophical point of view. Comparative study of both will throw light on some striking similarities as well as some differences of these great philosophers. (shrink)

Rāmānuja (ācārya), the eleventh century South Indian philosopher, is the chief proponent of Vishishtādvaita, which is one of the three main forms of the Orthodox Hindu philosophical school, Vedānta. As the prime philosopher of the Vishishtādvaita tradition, Rāmānuja is one of the Indian philosophical tradition’s most important and influential figures. He was the first Indian philosopher to provide a systematic theistic interpretation of the philosophy of the Vedas, and is famous for arguing for the epistemic and soteriological significance of bhakti, (...) or devotion to a personal God. Unlike many of his contemporaries, Rāmānuja defended the reality of a plurality of individual persons, qualities, values and objects while affirming the substantial unity of all. On some accounts, Rāmānuja’s influence on popular Hindu practice is so vast that his system forms the basis for popular Hindu philosophy. His two main philosophical writings (the Shrī Bhāshya and Vedārthasangraha) are amongst the best examples of rigorous and energetic argumentation in any philosophical tradition, and they are masterpieces of Indian scholastic philosophy. (shrink)

Performance of duty [dharma], without attachment to results, eradicates evil action [karman] and thus promotes the growth ofbhakti, which is the sole means of attainingmoksa. Although associated with such internal (mental or intellectual) activity asdhyāna, jñāna, vedana andvidyā, bhakti nevertheless demands the external practice of daily and occasional activity —karman — prescribed by Scripture. If one neglects to perform thekarman enjoined for one's caste and stage of life, one's mind will be corrupted and will be incapable of attaining knowledge (meditation) (...) of the personalbrahman. If one'skarman is associated withbhakti, one can attain the Lord through His grace. In Rāmānuja's scheme,karman is thus not only a prerequisite for the origination of meditation on the Lord, but also for acquisition of perfect knowledge (para-bhakti) of Him. Obviously,karman, unlikebhakti, is not a direct means of salvation: it is only an auxiliary. Rāmānuja, however, emphasizes thatkarman should be continued as long as one lives. Rāmānuja's discussion ofkarman thus provides a theoretical foundation to his position that the karma-mīmāmsa — the philosophical study and interpretation of ritual activity — is indispensable to the inquiry intobrahman. (shrink)

In the opening sections of his Brahma-sutra-bhasya , Ramanuja makes a very forceful assault on Sankara's Advaita theory. This assault anticipates in a striking way modern western attacks on metaphysical religious positions, attacks which stem from Hume and are associated today with names like A. J. Ayer and Antony Flew. In this paper I wish to argue that certain aspects of Sankara's position, as enunciated in his Brahma-sutra-bhasya , suggest that Ramanunja's assault, and therefore by implication a modern western attack (...) on Sankara also, depends for its success on a misinterpretation of Sankara's views. I wish then to suggest a possible alternative interpretation of Sankara's Advaita in terms viable for today, drawing, though indirectly, on such writers as R. B. Braithwaite and R. M. Hare. An incidental implication of this paper is that these two philosophers of religion would meet less opposition from the religious if they were Hindu rather than Christian! A more important implication is that light could be thrown on the present religious controversy in the west by a study of Indian philosophy of religion, if only we were more disposed to treat it as a living tradition which might teach us something, rather than as an antique. (shrink)

Vedānta has two meanings. The first is the literal sense – “End of Vedas” – and refers to the Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads—the latter part of the Vedas. The second sense of “Vedanta” is a scholastic one, and refers to a philosophical orientation that attempts to explain the cryptic Vedānta Sūtra (Brahma Sūtra) of Bādarāyaṇa, which aims at being a summary of the End of the Vedas. In the previous module, I review the ethics of the End of the Vedas and (...) explicate the Moral Irrealism of Śaṅkara’s Advaita Vedānta, which is articulated as a commentary on the Vedānta Sūtra. In this module, I compare Rāmānuja (Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta) and Madhva's (Dvaita Vedānta) account of the Vedānta Sūtra. Both are moral realists. They differ on the room for freedom given the necessity of moral considerations. One value of the Vedānta approach to ethics is that it provides a non-speciesist framework to think about ethics. It allows us to understand ourselves (ātmā) and our interest in Development (Brahman) as conceptually distinct, though identical in some manner. The Advaita view is that this identity is strict. The Dvaita approach is that Development realises the results of choices of individuals, but only some, owing to their good character, are capable of taking advantage of this for their betterment. The Viśiṣṭādvaita approach of Rāmānuja suggests in contrast that each self is a microcosm of reality. Reality is Development – the genus of individual selves. Each self has Development as an essential trait, but owing to past choices (karma), this is poorly understood. Things change when the individual self understands Brahman to be its true self, for then an individual can re-direct their efforts from procuring results to self-governance by treating the personal essence of the Development (the Lord) as the explanation for improvement. (shrink)

In his Brahmasūtrabhāṣya 1.1.4, Rāmānuja argues that the knowledge of the liberated person precludes ignorance and its effects, and therefore precludes the possibility of jīvanmukti (embodied liberation). The Advaitin replies that the knowledge of the liberated is consistent with a certain kind of karma that prolongs embodiment, hence jīvanmukti is possible. In his Bhagavadgītābhāṣya 2.12, however, Rāmānuja points out that even if the jīvanmukta (embodied liberated person) still experiences appearances, he does not count them as reasons for acting, and therefore (...) does not act. Hence Rāmānuja’s objection to jīvanmukti is both conceptual and practical, and it is the practical problem that is the more difficult to resolve. (shrink)

The problem of synthesis and reconciliation of the Ramanuja and Sirhindi is of vital significance and importance, and no serious student of comparative philosophy can deliberately neglect it. Epistemologically speaking, these two philosophers have been forced to tackle the same problem(s), and in solving them, their methods and hypotheses have been noticeably similar. The emphasis of this paper is to recognize, highlight, and compare the aspects valued in Ramanuja’s epistemological views with those of the Sirhindi. I will also discuss the (...) basic postulates of Ramanuja and Sirhindi’s epistemology and underline certain epistemological approaches to knowledge and justification for formulating the arguments to find out new dimensions in outlining their fundamental epistemological positions. This paper explores certain elements in the identities of these two philosophers and attempts to demonstrate a thread of continuity, especially with regard to their methods and thoughts. This paper also brings out a brief critical account of their epistemological views. (shrink)

On the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy of Rāmānuja, 1017-1137.

Analytic Panpsychism has been brought into contact with Indian philosophy primarily through an examination of the Advaita Vedānta tradition and the Yogācāra tradition. In this work I explore the relation between Rāmānuja, the 12th century father of the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta tradition, and analytic panpsychism. I argue that Rāmānuja’s philosophy inspires a more world affirming form of cosmopsychism where there are different kinds of reality, rather than one fundamental reality of pure consciousness and an ordinary wrold that is illusory from the (...) perspective of fundamental reality. (shrink)

In this essay I propose to offer some observations in due course on how Christian thought and practice in general might profit from a central theme in the theology of Rāmānuja, a Tamil Vaisnava Brahmin whose traditional date straddles the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Christian era. The central theme I have in mind is expressed in Rāmānuja's view that the ‘world’ is the ‘body’ of Brahman or God. We shall go on to explain what this means, but let (...) me state first that my overall aim is to further inter-religious understanding, especially between Christian and Hindu points of view. In professing a concern for inter-religious dialogue I know that I reflect a longstanding interest of Professor H. D. Lewis. I shall seek to show that the Christian religion can profit both from the content and the method of Rāmānuja's body-of-God theology. To this end this essay is divided into two sections. Section I is the longer: it contains an analysis of what Rāmānuja did mean by his body-of-God theme – doubtless unfamiliar ground for most of the readers of this essay – and serves as a propaedeutic for what follows in section 2. In section 2 I shall attempt to ‘extrapolate’ Rāmānuja's thinking into a Christian context, with dialogue in mind. Section 2 cannot be appreciated for the promise I hope it holds out without the detail of the first section. (shrink)

As we explore panentheism, what can we learn from Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita? Although widely acknowledged as a panentheist, in the contemporary debate on how to characterize panentheism, Rāmānuja barely features. But Rāmānuja's position is worth studying not just because it bears on taxonomical questions. Among its interesting features is a conception on which devotional love, bhakti, serves an epistemic function that is also of crucial soteriological relevance. This chapter addresses both these topics. First, Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita is used to cast doubt on (...) a characterization of panentheism recently proposed by Mikael Stenmark. Second, Rāmānuja's conception of bhakti is juxtaposed with two conceptions of love that serve an analogous dual function: Weil's conception of supernatural love and Murdoch's conception of love as just attention. Rāmānuja's position, it is argued, is distinct, partly due to his panentheist commitments, but it also shares a number of features with the other two. In closing, it is suggested that for further comparative work on these three, ample room remains. (shrink)

The proposed study endeavors to delve into the philosophical concepts of self and identity as elucidated by the eminent Indian philosopher Rāmānujachārya. This critical examination aims to underscore Rāmānuja’s perspective on the self, surpassing the limitations inherent in both physical and mentalist accounts of human existence. The study specifically directs attention to queries surrounding self-ownership, the constancy of identity amidst change, consciousness, and its interconnection with the self. Unlike explanations that reduce the notion of self to either the body or (...) the mind, this study seeks to explicate Rāmānuja's accounts of self and identity by recognizing that merely equating the self with the body or mind fails to address the profound sense of ownership or possession we experience. In the vast landscape of Indian philosophical thought, the self is traditionally viewed as inherently eternal, temporarily associated with the body for the purpose of navigating accumulated karma across multiple lifetimes. However, this study diverges from moralistic and eschatological discussions, concentrating instead on the metaphysical aspects articulated by Rāmānuja. Central to Rāmānuja's philosophy is the juxtaposition of Brahman, the ultimate reality, with ātman, the individual self present in all living beings. Distinctions among beings are attributed to the nature of the bodies they inhabit. The crux of the matter lies in understanding the relationship between the individual self and Brahman, conceptualized as a part–whole relationship. Consequently, the inquiry emerges: How does the part relate to the whole? What is the nature of the self in the context of Brahman? This paper undertakes a dual-level philosophical analysis of the notion self. It explores the metaphysical level, seeking to comprehend the general meaning and significance of the self. Simultaneously, it delves into the contextual and particular dimensions, unraveling the specific conceptualizations that the individual self undergoes contingent upon its situations. Further questions pertaining to self and identity come to the forefront. How does the self relate to its identity—is it pre-given or constructed? Is there an intrinsic essence to the identity of the self? Addressing these questions inevitably draws attention to the intertwined issues of caste and gender within this philosophical discourse. (shrink)

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The paper deals with some religious and philosophical ideas of the Austrian philosopher Gerhard Oberhammer, who analyses the religious text of vishishta-advaita tradition from the point of Levinas’ philosophy. In the final fragment of his article Oberhammer analyses the formula of Ramanuja parabhaktiparajVAnaparamabhakti, which is understood in the works of the later thinkers of vishishta-advaita as prapatti. Meanwhile this formula for Ramanuja himself means only the meditative God-vision in the form of the steady remembering of God and vision of Him (...) in the images of the Vishnu religion. (shrink)

본 논문은 라마누자(Rāmānuja)의 실천론 속에서 박띠(Bhakti)와 쁘라빠띠(Prapatti)가 어떠한 의미로 취급되며 또 두 개념 사이에는 어떤 연관성이 있는지 살펴보는 데에 중점을 두었다. 긴 시간의 흐름과 함께 인도 전통의 요가, 따빠스 등의 다양한 수행법이 전승되었는데, 베단따 학자뿐만 아니라 신앙을 바탕으로 한 위슈누(Viṣṇu) 종교의 지도자로서 라마누자의 실천체계 속에는 다양한 형태의 수행법이 나타난다. 따라서 먼저 혼선을 빚고 있는 라마누자의 실천론을 체계적으로 정립할 필요를 느꼈다. 정립된 결론을 가지고 특히 정통 베단따 학파의 수행론과는 달리 해탈의 길로 제시되고 있는 순수 종교적인 대안인 神의 품안에 은신처를 찾고자 하는 (...) ‘歸依’, ‘獻身’ ‘隨順修行’의 뜻을 지닌 쁘라빠띠와 신을 信愛하는 박띠의 의미 분석을 시도해 보았다. 종래의 일반적인 의미의 신에 대한 귀의, 헌신, 신애하는 종교적 정서를 지닌 쁘라빠띠와 박띠, 그리고 마지막 수단으로 신의 은혜(prasāda)를 강조하는 유신론적인 해석이 라마누자의 경우에 있어서는 인도 전통의 수행법인 명상의 의미 내지는 초월적 인식이라는 영역으로까지 확대되어 사용되고 있다는 점을 밝혀 보았다. 이 점에서 라마누자의 여러 다른 저술 속에서 각기 다르게 사용되는 박띠와 쁘라빠띠의 동일성을 확립하는 실마리를 찾았다. 또한 신앙과 헌신만으로도 해탈할 수 있다는 충분한 종교적 가능성을 새롭게 새길 수 있었다. (shrink)

The great eleventh-century figure, Rāmānuja, belonged to the Śrīvaiṣṇava community that worshiped the divine as Viṣṇu-with-Śrī, the Lord-and-Consort. But he also embarked on a project to develop an interpretation of the first-century Vedāntasūtra, which presented the supposedly core teachings of the major Upaniṣads, traditionally the last segment of the sacred corpus of the Vedas. Rāmānuja sought to reconcile the devotional commitments of Śrīvaiṣṇavism—which was built on the human yearning for the divine that was incomprehensibly Other while graciously accessible—with the conceptual (...) demands of the Vedānta in which a profound identity between the individual self (ātman) and the impersonal, ultimate explanatory principle (brahman) was taught. This reconciliation of difference and identity came to be called “Qualified Nondualism.” In his earliest work, the Vedārthasaṃgraha, one of the ways Rāmānuja points to reconciliation is through identifying a single state of consciousness as both cognition of nonduality (the Vedāntic project) and the emotionally valent experience of happiness (the supreme expression of the human encounter with the divine). It does not seem that he systematically pursues this conception of how a state can be both cognitive and affective, and such an analysis will require independent philosophical analysis. Thus, this article argues that if a state of consciousness were indeed both cognitive and affective in this way, we would have a full explanation for how the devotional approach of a human being to Viṣṇu-with-Śrī can also be the self’s realization of identity with brahman. (shrink)

This article examines the basic content of the Brahmasutra and compares and contrasts the commentaries of Ramanuja and Shankara on it. Firstly the issue of possible errors or interpolations in the BSis addressed. Then the full contents of the BS is surveyed briefly but with important detail. Finally, the important disagreements between the commentaries of Ramanuja and Shankara on the BSare discussed. This includes discussion of selected sutras in question.

Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja were not solely textists; nor were they merely existential metaphysicians; nor were they a combination of both. Rather, their epistemologies involve a sixfold use of vitally important sacred and secular pramāṇa-s as instruments in orchestrated fashion where symphonies of their respective ontologies are given to their listeners. With the two Vedāntins, no pramāṇa is in every case the lead instrument. Rather, they employ any of the six as lead instrument at various times, depending on the pedagogic and/or (...) apologetic context, while the others support the melody played by the lead. The result for both teachers is a melodic epistemological opposed-to-the-other composition characterized by careful thought and use of the six pramāṇa-s, all with the goal of defending their respective traditions of Vedānta as the truth of the matter at hand—knowledge of Brahman. (shrink)

"Life and philosophy of Manạvāḷa Māmun̲i, 1370-1444, and Veṅkatạnātha, 1268-1369, exponents of Śrī Vaisṇạvism"--PL-480 record.